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SMALL FISH, BIG MONEY: CONFLICTS EVOLVING 
AROUND NEW FISHING TECHNIQUES AND OLD FISHING 
RIGHTS AT THE SHORES OF LAKE CHAD, NIGERIA 
Matthias Krings 
Prologue 
In 1998 Alhaji Buba, who has been my neighbour for several months in a vil-
lage at the Nigerian margins of Lake Chad, had many expenses: he rebuilt his 
wood and straw compound with mud bricks and zinc roofing, married his 
fourth wife, took care of his nephew's marriage, travelled together with his 
first wife to Mecca by air, made sacrifices of rams every fortnight, distributed 
gifts and alms to rich and poor, commoners and government officials alike, 
financed political campaigns and many things more. The money necessary to 
meet all these expenses came right from the waters of Lake Chad. As an or-
ganiser of a dumba-fish fence Alhaji Buba belongs to a number of immigrant 
Hausa fishermen who are engaged in a new and highly effective fishing tech-
nique. According to a popular saying “being the organiser of a dumba-fish 
fence is more profitable than being the owner of a factory”. And as we will 
see, where plenty of money can be made, plenty of conflicts are likely to 
arise.1 
In brief my argument goes as follows: dumba-fishing was invented at Lake 
Chad about 10 years ago by immigrant fishermen from Mali and Nigerian 
Hausaland. The new technique brought about a new era of Lake Chad fishery, 
characterised by social and institutional changes. Titled Kanuri fishery head-
men (Kacalla njibe)2 who traditionally controlled the access to the lake's water 
were unable to cope with the massive influx of immigrant fishermen. The lack 
of an institution for effective control lead to serious conflicts between local 
and immigrant fishermen. With the Fishermen Association Marte Local Gov-
ernment a new institution was invented, in which local and immigrant fisher-
men, regardless of their ethnicity, should control access to the fishing grounds 
together. The Fishermen Association was modelled after “modern” urban in-
stitutions and thus mirrors the transformation of the lake shores from rural 
                                           
1  The paper is based on eight months of research in the Nigerian Lake Chad area. I wish to 
express my gratitude to the people of Marte Local Government Area who supported my 
research in many ways. I also wish to thank Marie-Thérèse Sarch for commenting on my 
paper. 
2  Except for this title which is Kanuri all other African terms are Hausa.   94 
backwaters, with local customs and culture to an economic centre, character-
ised by in-migration, cultural diversity and several other 'urban' traits.3  
A technique called dumba 
In its widespread use at the lake shores the term dumba can be translated best 
as “fish fence”.4 The fences are constructed in shallow water and consist of 
fish traps (gura) which are placed next to one another in a long row. Big 
fences reach over 1000 traps and cover a distance of more than one kilometre. 
The fences are either constructed with the rise of the water before the peak of 
the annual tide in December or with the falling water-level after the peak. 
Since the dumba-fences cut across natural water-courses through which the 
lake floods and retreats, migratory fish are trapped. Traps remain inside the 
water for several months. During this period they are emptied every second or 
third day. Most of the catch is sold on the spot to fish traders, the remainder is 
dried and later on sold by the fishermen themselves.5 
The social organisation of a dumba-fish fence 
Dumba-fishing usually requires a group of fishermen working together at one 
dumba-site. The organiser of the dumba, who pays fees, deals with authorities 
(see below) and coordinates the work is called uban dumba, “Father of the 
dumba”. The money that the uban dumba spends on acquiring the seasonal 
fishing rights is still surpassed by the money which he has to spend on nylon 
nets. The nets are usually fixed behind the traps in order to prevent fish from 
slipping through the gaps between the traps. The capital needed to cover these 
expenses may well exceed 100.000 Naira (2.000 DM).6 Usually the uban 
dumba is the one who places the largest number of traps within the fish fence. 
Fishermen who join the fence with their own traps have to pay the uban 
dumba in cash or kind. To compensate the uban dumba different systems are 
                                           
3  For more details on the social and cultural diversity of the region under study see the 
contributions of KIRSCHT/WERTHMANN and PLATTE in this volume, as well as KRINGS 
1998 and PLATTE forthcoming. 
4  Though Kanuri fishermen are reluctant to take part in this type of fishing, dumba or 
rather d↔mba is a term of Kanuri origin. In its Kanuri meaning d↔mba describes an 
artificial earthen dam. In the Lake Chad area such small dams are used in years of an 
exceptionally high tide to prevent the lake water from entering into the villages. I guess 
that the widespread use of the term dumba meaning “fish fence” is rooted in the 
similarity of the two actions: in the first case the free flow of water is prevented in the 
second that of fish. 
5  For  more visual images of dumba fishing see ANDERHUB and KRINGS 1999. 
6  The monthly income of a secondary school teacher was at that time about 1.200 Naira 
(24 DM).   95
in use, all of which are closely connected to the way in which fish fences are 
constructed. 
Dumba-fences are divided into a middle part (tsakiya) and two parts on each 
side of the middle part which are called gefe (side). The middle part covers the 
deepest part of the water and is that part of the dumba which is operated 
longest. Here nylon nets are fixed behind the traps. On the “sides”, where the 
water is shallow, no nets are fixed and the traps placed here will fall dry first 
during the cause of the receding water. The middle part is divided into units 
called “doors”.7 Depending on the size of the traps each “door” (⎦ofa) consists 
of seven or eight traps. Fishermen who want to place their traps in the middle 
part of the dumba are allocated “doors” by the uban dumba. The systems to 
compensate the uban dumba which are in use at present can be summarised as 
follows: 
a) The  uban dumba takes cash from the fishermen who place their traps in 
the middle part of the fence. (In 1998 2.500 Naira had to be paid for each 
“door”.) Fishermen who place their traps at the “sides” do not have to pay 
in cash but pay in kind: here the uban dumba has the right to claim the 
catch of all traps on one particular day (upon the exact date of which he 
decides) his own. This institution is effective only once in a season and is 
called ganin uban dumba (uban dumba's catch removal). 
b)  No fisherman has to pay in cash, instead the uban dumba is compensated 
in kind. This system is based on a shared right to remove the catch be-
tween uban dumba and all the other fishermen. In some cases the right to 
the catch changes weekly: during the first week everybody removes the 
catch of his own traps. In the second week the uban dumba calls the catch 
of all traps his own. Even during those weeks when their catch is taken by 
the uban dumba fishermen have to be present at the site in order to help 
emptying their traps, to repair and replace them. For the uban dumba this 
system is by far more profitable than the one described above. 
c)  Sometimes the cost of fixing a dumba is shared equally between the fish-
ermen taking part in it. This system can be observed only with smaller fish 
fences where less fishermen are involved. 
The dumba-revolution: Social and institutional transformations of 
Lake Chad fishery 
At the open water Lake Chad fishery had always been an open access system. 
Only at the lake margins access to the water had been controlled by traditional 
                                           
7  The unit “door” is fixed by using the traditional measurement gaba: the distance from 
finger tip to finger tip of a man spreading his arms apart. Three gaba (approximately six 
metres) make up one “door”. Big dumba-fences consist of 100 “doors” and more in the 
middle part of the fence.   96 
Kanuri fishery headmen, the Kacalla njibe.8 The power and authority of a Ka-
calla was strongest at the immediate off-shore region that belonged to his 
village area and diminished rapidly towards the open water. As titled office 
holder a Kacalla was and still is part of the traditional administrative system 
of Borno. Historically one of his functions was to supply on demand the 
higher levels of the administrative hierarchy with fish. Annually after the peak 
of the tide the Kacalla and his followers constructed artificial ponds from 
which they gradually drained the water to catch the fish inside. Historically 
this type of seasonal fishery was a communal affair and beneficial to all mem-
bers of the local communities. Fishing activities were for subsistence rather 
than market-oriented.  
Prior to the invention of dumba-fences traditional Kanuri fishermen en-
gaged in artificial pond fishing had no competitors with static fishing gear. 
Hausa fishermen who had been around for more than two decades either used 
hooklines or different types of nets, frequently changing their position. The 
first dumba fish-fences, which in Marte Local Government were erected only 
about 6 years ago, suddenly changed the situation. Now Hausa fishermen and 
fishermen from Mali threatened the traditional monopoly of the Kanuri fishery 
headmen, who soon discovered a drastic drop in catches. The basic problem 
was one of coordination in space and time of the two fishing techniques. 
Because the new dumba-technique was suitable for deeper water than the arti-
ficial-pond-technique, the dumba-fences of the immigrants were often built in 
front of the dam constructions of the Kanuri. While dumba fences were 
erected during the rise of the water level, as early as November, the artificial 
ponds could be built only after the peak of the annual tide around January. The 
combination of these two factors caused a decline of catch for the Kanuri. 
 
During the early encounters immigrant fishermen gradually were made to ac-
cept the older rights of the Kanuri fishery headmen who were backed by their 
village heads.9 Through the fishery headmen village heads then started to 
collect seasonal fees from the immigrant dumba-fishermen. Thus the trans-
formation of the water into a commodity took its roots and the hitherto un-
known seasonal “selling” of fishing grounds began. Still, there was no effec-
tive control of access to the water. Not every dumba-organiser was willing to 
                                           
8  Very little is known about historical fishery management at Lake Chad. Whether the 
institution of Kacalla njibe existed everywhere on the shores is not known. NEILAND 
(1997) who's project worked in the neighbouring Monguno and Kukawa L.G.As does 
not mention this institution. At least in recent times in Baga village area of Kukawa 
L.G.A. it is another traditional title holder, the Kaigama, who is controlling access to the 
water (SARCH 1995: 33). 
9 The fishery headmen symbolically expressed their rights to the dumba-sites by 
frequently appearing on the sites, demanding for compensatory 'gifts'. Rather than 
questioning the legitimacy of the fishery headmen Hausa fishermen accepted these 
demands by gifts of fish and small sums of money.   97
pay for the sake of peace and attempts of either group to destroy the gear of 
the other were made. However, the beginning transfer of fishing rights from 
indigenous people to immigrants paved the way to an alienation of the lake 
margins that should aggravate over the years. The discontent of the Kanuri 
fishermen grew again when modern authority in the form of local government 
revenue collectors, who welcomed dumba fences as source of revenue, ap-
peared on the scene. The collection of fees was taken over by modern author-
ity which compensated the traditional authorities – very much to the disap-
pointment of the latter – only with a very limited share of the total.  
The ban of dumba-fishing by the Federal Department of Fisheries in 1995 
(MADAKAN 1997: 337) gave the whole situation an unexpected turn.10 Coin-
cidence or not, backed by the local government authorities and the divisional 
police force local Kanuri fishermen began with the destruction of dumba-
fences. Thus the federal decision to discourage dumba-fishing was locally 
implemented. For the Kanuri fishery headmen and their people who had 
solved the conflicts with machetes and clubs competition for control over and 
access to fishing grounds seemed over and won. Far from being beaten the 
immigrant fishermen took their complaints to the local government head-
quarters of Marte with the intention to take the destroyers of their gear to court 
for the violation of their property. At that point, as oral history has it, the 
chairman of the local government intervened and proposed the foundation of 
an association in which the conflicting parties should exert control over the 
access to the water together. 
The Fishermen Association Marte Local Government 
The Fishermen Association Marte Local Government has the structure of 
modern social and political institutions similar to that of political parties, un-
ions, self-help groups or social clubs. This structure is characterised by a hier-
archy of posts ranging from chairman, via secretary, auditor and others to or-
dinary membership. The Fishermen Association has a written constitution 
(which is difficult to come across), a neat printed letter heading which reads 
all members of the committee, it issues laminated membership cards, and it is 
formally recognised by the local government authorities. The posts of the 
committee were shared among the three major ethnic groups of the region: 
Kanuri, Shuwa-Arabs and Hausa – irrespective of the fact that Shuwa-Arabs 
usually do not engage in fishing. The honour of grand patronship was given to 
the chairman of the Local government. The post of chairman of the association 
was given to the one Kanuri fishery headmen who was most willing to 
collaborate with modern authorities and who at the same time was also pro-
                                           
10 Dumba-fishing was banned in theory since 1992 by the Inland Fisheries Decree. It was 
only in 1995 that the Federal Department of Fisheries enforced the ban. I have to thank 
M.-T. Sarch for pointing that out to me. See also MADAKAN (1997: 329ff).   98 
moted to chief fishery headmen – an institution which formerly did not exist. 
As vice-chairman figures a Hausa fisherman who due to his charismatic per-
sonality had been prominent among the Hausa fishermen of the area since 
long. The post of secretary is held by a Shuwa-Arab who is able to read and 
write roman script and who is fluent in local Arabic, Kanuri and Hausa. The 
other committee members are either Kanuri fishery headmen or prominent 
Hausa fishermen. 
With the invention of the Fishermen Association the taxes or fees which 
have to be paid by the individual organisers of dumba-fences went up to 
25.000 Naira (about 500,- DM). Compared to the income a dumba yields this 
amount is negligible for the organiser of the dumba. However, for those who 
receive these fees they constitute a fine extra-income. The sum of 25.000 
Naira calculates as follows: 10.000 Naira are collected by the local govern-
ment as revenue; 5.000 Naira are paid to the traditional Kanuri fishery head-
man in who's territory the dumba is fixed; 5.000 Naira go to the Fishermen 
Association and another 5.000 Naira are shared between the village head (la-
wan) and the ward head (b↔lama), in who's territory the fish fence is con-
structed. In the 1998/99 high-tide season 15 dumba-fences have been con-
structed in Marte L.G.A., and a much higher number of smaller fences – for 
which the fees are only half as high – are constructed every year around the 
low-tide season. Given these numbers it becomes obvious that dumba-fishing 
has developed into a valuable source of income for several interest-groups. 
Different interests, different opinions: Protagonists in a local drama 
Different interest groups who are directly or indirectly involved into the work 
of the Fishermen Association have different opinions about the association's 
aims and achievements. For the local government officials as most powerful 
actors in this local drama the greatest achievement of the association is seen in 
the collection of revenue from individual dumba-organisers. At least the 
records of the responsible local government department read as such.11 
Whether the chairman of the local government who – according to the Fisher-
men Association – had proposed the foundation of the association was con-
scious about the contradiction of this action to federal law remains obscure. 
(Dumba-fences had been declared illegal and banned by the Inland Fisheries 
Decree since 1992. The ban was enforced by the Federal Department of Fish-
eries in 1995.) What ever the case may be, today, official revenue collectors of 
Marte Local Government openly approach dumba-organisers at the sites of 
their fish fences with the aid of the Fishermen Association. For the local gov-
ernment chairman the association also became an important medium to 
mobilise voters at the eve of the local government elections among the 
numerous Hausa immigrants of the lake margins. The leading Hausa 
                                           
11 I have to thank my colleague Editha Platte for bringing this file to my attention.   99
committee members did their best to support the powerful patron of their 
association and won him many votes as well as financial support for his 
political campaigns. 
For the Hausa committee members, who at present dominate the activities 
of the association, the Fishermen Association is a perfect tool to protect their 
own interests in certain dumba-sites and a powerful instrument to control ac-
cess to the water. At the beginning of every season the committee “discusses” 
how the limited number of dumba-sites are distributed. Since the Hausa com-
mittee members act as gate-keepers they do not have to fear competitors to 
their fishing grounds. Due to their helping hand in revenue collection their 
activities are sanctioned by modern authorities. The vice-chairman of the as-
sociation and his immediate followers do not only have their own unchal-
lenged dumba-sites, but also have the undisputed privilege to place some of 
their fish traps in every other fish fence of the area. Consequently the Hausa 
members of the committee not only achieved power and authority but also 
gained a massive increase of financial resources.  
Individual Hausa dumba-organisers, who are ordinary members of the as-
sociation, sometimes regard the association as self-help group or union. The 
committee seems to purport the notion that the association may get financial 
aid from the government one day, with which new fishing gear for all shall be 
bought. The fees which have to be paid to the association are expected to be 
used as sort of “quick-aid-money” in cases where members are in desperate 
need of money or new fishing gear. However, when in early 1999 one of the 
committee members asked for the where-abouts of the dumba-fees he had to 
learn that other committee members had made use of the money to buy expen-
sive nylon nets for their own personal use. 
The traditional Kanuri fishery headmen experience a loss of their former 
power and authority and probably also a decrease of financial resources. 
Similar to ordinary dumba-organisers Kanuri fishery headmen who still en-
gage in their traditional fishing technique now also have to pay revenue and a 
fee to the association for every artificial pond that they build.12 Six out of the 
seven Kacalla njibe of the lake margins in Marte L.G.A. stated that they ac-
cept the association only for a lack of alternative. The association's protection 
by the local government authorities is felt as too powerful to act up against. 
The seventh Kacalla was reluctant to complain about the association, he, at 
least, was promoted to chief of all fishery headmen and chairman of the asso-
ciation, which formally looks like an increase of power. Today, every Kanuri 
fishery headman gets a fee (or compensation?) of 5.000 Naira for every fish 
fence that is fixed on his territory. This sum is not paid directly by the respec-
tive dumba-organiser to the Kacalla but transmitted by the Hausa vice-chair-
                                           
12 Sometimes the forced payment of revenue and association fees is used by Hausa 
committee members to demonstrate their power to the Kanuri fishery headmen: when in 
1998 the Kacalla of one village area was unable to pay his fees cash down, the 
association confiscated his boat.    100 
man. This transaction symbolically stresses the role of the association as con-
trolling body and also limits the possibilities for the headmen to make some 
extra money by charging higher rates from the dumba-organisers. 
Transformation of conflicts 
Whereas prior to the foundation of the Fishermen Association competition 
between immigrant and indigenous fishermen using different types of static 
gear was the main source of conflict, today competition for fishing grounds 
among dumba-organisers, irrespective of their ethnic origin, is a prominent 
source of conflicts and quarrels. (The profitability of fish fences and especially 
that of fences erected in specific areas is well known.) Where ethnicity can be 
used as an argument to kick out competitors it is used. Such is the case with 
dumba fishermen from Mali who as national strangers are regarded by many 
as second class citizens who consequently have to step aside if a Nigerian 
national declares interest in their dumba-sites. Competition among Hausa 
dumba-organisers also frequently occurs. With the approaching dumba-season 
every year there is sort of a race between dumba organisers competing for the 
same fishing grounds. With gifts and advance-payment of the fees competitors 
try to gain the favour of the vice-chairman of the Fishermen Association. 
Other  dumba organisers try to circumvent the vice-chairman directly ap-
proaching instead the respective Kacalla and the village head of the territory 
where they intend to fix their fish fences. Since this procedure threatens the 
monopoly of the Hausa committee members by enhancing the status of the 
Kanuri fishery headmen it is highly disregarded by the former. However, 
every year rumours can be heard about exorbitant sums of money spent by 
dumba-organisers to secure their rights.13 
Summary and conclusion 
To sum up and conclude let me stress three points: 
a)  With the invention of dumba-fishing portions of water, or rather certain 
fishing grounds at the margins of the lake became commodities. At the same 
time a remarkable shift in fishing activities with static gear from indigenous to 
immigrant fishermen took place – a process which by Kanuri fishermen was 
experienced as alienation. Where once seasonal fishing was conducted as a 
communal affair by the indigenous inhabitants of the lake margins it is today 
undertaken as profit oriented fishing industry by immigrant fishermen.  
b)  The Fishermen Association is one of the rare formal institutions within the 
area of our field studies with trans-ethnic character. It was founded with the 
                                           
13 Whether true or not – these rumours serve to glorify the dumba-organisers which serve 
as role models for younger and poorer fishermen.   101
explicit aim to overcome ethnic conflicts. However, traditional Kanuri fishery 
headmen and Hausa dumba-organisers who are members of the committee, are 
far from acting in concert. Today its Hausa members dominate the activities of 
the association. Without the support of the local government authorities, who 
benefit from the association's help in revenue collection, the Hausa committee 
members would have less power. One can even speculate that the association 
would fall apart as soon as support from modern authorities would break 
away. 
c)  The question than that remains to be asked is: how effective is the Fish-
ermen Association in preventing or solving conflicts about fishing rights? At 
first sight it seems as if the association has become a great success: open con-
flicts between Kanuri fishery headmen and immigrant dumba-fishermen no 
longer exist. However, I would argue that this is not an achievement of the 
association but that conflicts of this type are today rather suppressed than 
solved. They are suppressed by the power of the local government authorities 
who protect the association and Hausa-dominated dumba-fishing. The tradi-
tional Kanuri fishery headmen, who privately still oppose dumba-fishing, ac-
cept the association only because it is seen as inevitable since it is invented 
and protected by modern authority. What probably would happen if (local) 
governmental protection of dumba-fishing would break away can be seen even 
presently at the neighbouring Ngala Local Government area where modern 
authorities strongly oppose dumba-fishing. Here the balance of power is in 
favour of the Kanuri fishery headmen who have a strong lobby. Every season 
a mixed troop of Kanuri fishermen, police and mobile police sets out to 
destroy fish fences which have been erected illegally mostly by Hausa fisher-
men.  
Whether the governmental support of the association persists does not only 
depend on the political development of the local government but also on the 
ability of the association to effectively control its members, which is a task 
that might become more difficult in the future. Given the fact that places 
where fish fences can be erected are limited in number it is likely that quarrels 
and conflicts among dumba-organisers will rise during the next years. And I 
doubt very much that at that point people like my neighbour Alhaji Buba and 
other dumba-organisers are willing to accept the unchallenged power of the 
Fishermen Association any longer. 
References 
ANDERHUB, S.; KRINGS, M. (1999) : Cadi – Inna al moya / Lake Chad – Mother of 
water. Video film, 35 min. Frankfurt. 
KRINGS, M. (1998): Migrant Hausa communities in the lake: Preliminary research 
notes from Lake Chad. Borno Museum Society Newsletter 34/35: 31-41.   102 
MADAKAN, S.P. (1997): Management of the inland fisheries in North-East Nigeria: 
Institutional arrangements. In: Neiland, A.E. (ed.): Traditional management 
of artisanal fisheries in North East Nigeria: final report. S. 320-350. CE-
MARE Report 43. Portsmouth. 
NEILAND, A.E. (ed.) (1997): Traditional management of artisanal fisheries in North 
East Nigeria: final report. CEMARE Report 43. Portsmouth. 
PLATTE, E. (forthcoming): Pioneers in the lake. Female migrants in newly founded 
settlements in the Lake Chad region of NE-Nigeria. A multivocal view. In: 
Knörr, J. and Barbara Meier (eds.): Women and migration: Anthropological 
Perspectives.  
SARCH, M.-T. (1995): Community management systems at Lake Chad. Appropriate 
Technology 22,2: 32-33. 